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Abstract
A secure function evaluation protocol allows two parties to jointly compute a func-
tion f(x, y) of their inputs in a manner not leaking more information than necessary. A
major result in this field is: “any function f that can be computed using polynomial re-
sources can be computed securely using polynomial resources” (where ‘resources’ refers
to communication and computation). This result follows by a general transformation
from any circuit for f to a secure protocol that evaluates f . Although the resources
used by protocols resulting from this transformation are polynomial in the circuit size,
they are much higher (in general) than those required for an insecure computation of
f .
For the design of efficient secure protocols we suggest two new methodologies, that
differ with respect to their underlying computational models. In one methodology we
utilize the communication complexity tree (or branching program) representation of
f . We start with an efficient (insecure) protocol for f and transform it into a secure
protocol. In other words, “any function f that can be computed using communication
complexity c can be can be computed securely using communication complexity that
is polynomial in c and a security parameter”. The second methodology uses the circuit
computing f , enhanced with look-up tables as its underlying computational model. It
is possible to simulate any RAM machine in this model with polylogarithmic blowup.
Hence it is possible to start with a computation of f on a RAM machine and transform
it into a secure protocol.
We show many applications of these new methodologies resulting in protocols effi-
cient either in communication or in computation. In particular, we exemplify a protocol
for the “millionaires problem”, where two participants want to compare their values
but reveal no other information. Our protocol is more efficient than previously known
ones in either communication or computation.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared under the title Communication Preserving Protocols for
Secure Function Evaluation in Proceedings of the 33rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2001.
†Work done while the author was visiting Stanford University and the IBM Almaden research center.
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1 Introduction
Two parties, Alice with input x and Bob with input y, wish to evaluate a function z = f(x, y)
on their joint inputs in a manner that does not allow the other party to gain more information
than necessary about their inputs, i.e. more than can be deduced from z. A protocol that
allows Alice and Bob to achieve this is known as secure function evaluation of f . This
problem generalizes many cryptographic tasks and has been extensively investigated in the
last twenty years1. One of the most important results of the area is that “anything that
can computed efficiently can be securely evaluated in an efficient manner”. More precisely,
if the circuit complexity of f(x, y) is s, then there is a secure function evaluation protocol
operating in time polynomial in s and a security parameter, provided certain cryptographic
primitives exist.
The main goal of this work is to provide the communication complexity counterpart of
this result. Informally, if f(x, y) has communication complexity c, then there is a secure
function evaluation protocol for f with communication complexity which is polynomial in c
and a security parameter, provided certain cryptographic primitives exist.
Being polynomial in the communication complexity (as compared to the circuit complex-
ity) of a function leads to more efficient protocols for functions over large data held by the
parties. For many such functions, the communication complexity is significantly lower than
the size of the best known circuit. In particular, the communication complexity may be
sublinear in the input size. As an example consider computing the median: Alice and Bob
each hold subsets x, y of {1, . . . , n} and they wish to compute the median of x∪ y as a multi
set. For the median function there exists a protocol with logarithmic (in n) communication
complexity, hence the potential for a very efficient secure function evaluation protocol.
1.1 Related work
Secure function evaluation has been a very active research area and it has been investigated
in a variety of models regarding the participating parties behavior, power and number. For
any polynomially computable function f(x1, x2, . . . , xp) it is possible in principle to construct
a protocol that allows a group of p parties, where party i has as its private input xi, to jointly
evaluate f(x1, x2, . . . , xp) [23]. Following the protocol, the parties learn f(x1, x2, . . . , xp) but
no party i can learn about the other inputs {xj}j 6=i more than can be computed from her
own input xi and the outcome f(x1, x2, . . . xp). The drawback, however, is that many such
protocols are rather complex and require significant interaction between the parties – they
do not necessarily correspond to the minimum communication complexity protocol for f .
Many of the works in the field followed the ‘garbled circuit’ construction introduced
by Yao [49, 50] and [23] and thus concentrated on the representation of f by a Boolean
(combinatorial) circuit. The drawback of this representation is that operations such as
accessing a single element from a table result in a relatively large penalty in the circuit size.
More specifically, if one follows the ‘garbled circuit’ construction, as discussed in [43], then
1One of the first problems considered is Yao’s “millionaires problem” [49], where two participants want
to check which one has a larger value but leak no other information. Note that the name of the problem has
since then been updated to the “billionaires problem” . . .
1
the resulting complexity is that of invoking one OT21 for each input bit
2 plus a constant
number of pseudo-random function evaluations per each gate3.
Sublinear communication secure function evaluation protocols Our work is moti-
vated in part by the attention algorithms for massive datasets have received recently. For
many of these problems there are algorithms resulting in communication complexity which
is much smaller than the data size, but with no privacy guarantees. Recent results demon-
strated that it is possible to create private protocols for some of these tasks, without resorting
to the garbled circuit transformation, resulting in protocols with much lower communica-
tion complexity, see [16, 17] and [38]. As a consequence of our work, many more of these
algorithms can be evaluated securely with low communication overhead.
Impact of the representation of f on the complexity of secure function evalu-
ation Researches in the field of secure function evaluation have realized for quite some
time that choosing the underlying model is significant when designing a secure function
evaluation protocol for a function f . In particular, the specific representation chosen for f
can have a great impact on the complexity of its secure function evaluation protocol. Some
representations of f , other than Boolean circuits were used in previous works. To name a
few examples, Kilian [28] as well as [23, 5] used permutation branching programs, appealing
to Barrington’s Theorem. In the multiparty computation with an honest majority setting,
Ben-Or et el. [9], followed by many of the works in the area, used a representation of f by
an algebraic circuit. Feige et al. [14] and [26] used a representation of f as a product of
matrices over a large enough field. Beaver et al. [8] used the representation of f as a low
degree polynomial. A recent work by Ishai and Kushilevitz [27] introduced a representa-
tion of functions via randomizing polynomials and used it to construct round-efficient secure
multiparty protocols.
Communication complexity and privacy The question of whether it is possible to pre-
serve the communication complexity when constructing protocols for secure function evalu-
ation has been previously considered in the information theoretic setting by Kushilevitz4. In
the two party case only very special functions have an information theoretic private protocol
(see characterization in [32] and Kilian [29]). For functions that have private protocols in the
information theoretic setting, Kushilevitz [32] showed that their secure version protocol may
be much more expensive than their insecure version. There are functions for which any secure
evaluation protocol results in exponential communication (whereas linear communication is
sufficient for evaluating any function non-privately).
In the computational setting, assuming that oblivious transfer is possible, it turns out
that things are quite different: first, as is known from the garbled circuit results [49, 50],
it is possible to compute any function privately. What this work shows is, essentially, that
2OT21 is 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (see Section 2.2.1) and is a basic building of these protocols.
3The protocol described in [20] results in invoking one OT for each gate as well as each input bit.
4Kushilevitz addresses the problem of private two-party computation of a function. A more general
problem of the secure computation of a function in a multiparty setting with faulty processors was addressed
by Franklin and Yung [40].
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the disparity in the communication complexity does not exist: it is possible to compute any
function privately while preserving the communication.
Circuit complexity vs. Turing Machines and RAM machines When considering
circuits vs. Turing Machines, it is known that there is no significant advantage to the latter.
For a Turing Machine M running in time T (n) there exists a series of circuits {Cn}n∈IN of
size |Cn| = T (n) · polylog(T (n)) computing fM. This result follows from the fact that any
computation on a Turing Machine T may be simulated by an oblivious Turing Machine –
where the head position, as a function of time, is independent of the input. The oblivious
simulation results in a polylogarithmic blow-up [45]. (See further discussion in Section 5.1.1.)
The situation regarding circuits vs. RAM machines is not known. Since a RAM machine
M running in time T (n) using space S(n) may be simulated by a Turing Machine in time
O(T (n) · S(n)) (see [48] for more details), we have that it is possible to have a series of
circuits of size roughly O(T (n) · S(n)) computing fM. It is not known whether it is possible
to improve this bound, hence there is a potential gap – a computation on a RAM machine
may be much more efficient than any circuit family.
The relationship between circuit complexity and time complexity on a RAM machine
has relevance to secure function evaluation protocols – the complexity of many protocols (in
particular, those resulting from the garbled circuit transformation) is proportional to the
size of the best known circuit for a function. These protocols are rather inefficient when
compared with the insecure evaluation of the same function (naturally, on a RAM machine).
In part, this is due to lack of an efficient transformation from RAM machines to circuits.
In Section 5 we consider the computational model of circuits with look-up tables (LUT)
and show how to evaluate it securely and efficiently. We show that for circuits with LUT the
gap between the circuit size and a computation on a RAM machine is closed: for a RAM
machine M running in time T (n) using space S(n) there exists a series of circuits with LUT
{Cn}n∈IN of size |Cn| = T (n) · polylog(S(n)) computing fM, where the LUTs are of size
O(S(n)). These circuits lead, potentially, to much more efficient secure function evaluation
protocols.
1.2 Methodologies for designing sublinear communication secure
protocols
We give two new methodologies for designing secure protocols for a function f . In both
methodologies, the parties decompose the computation of f so that (i) every party first com-
putes some function of her own input, and (ii) the parties utilize the computed values in an
efficient protocol. In other words, suppose f(x, y) can be expressed as h(gA(x), gB(y)) where
gA and gB are (efficiently computable) arbitrary functions. If h can be computed securely
using sublinear communication, then we get a sublinear secure function evaluation protocol
for f . The difference between the two methodologies is in the underlying computational
model.
Communication complexity tree The computational model underlying the first method-
ology is the communication complexity tree (or branching program) computing f . In this
3
model, the functions gA, gB correspond to the choices made by the parties during the proto-
col (as discussed in Section 4, these choices are fully defined by the individual inputs of the
parties). The function h corresponds to evaluating the communication complexity tree (or
branching program) with respect to the parties’ choices.
For many useful and interesting functions the communication complexity of f is signifi-
cantly smaller than its input size. Examples for such functions include the median function
(mentioned above), the millionaires problem and Karchmer-Wigderson games.
We propose to utilize the representation of f by its communication complexity tree (or
branching program) and show that it can lead to tremendous savings in the communication
complexity as well as the computational complexity of secure function evaluation. For a
function f with input size that is relatively large when compared with its communication
complexity it is possible to break the cost barrier of an OT invocation per input introduced
by the ‘garbled circuit’ construction.
The general methodology we suggest is to start with a communication efficient (inse-
cure) protocol for the problem and transform it to obtain an efficient secure evaluation; the
efficiency can be either in communication or in computation.
As a direct application of this transformation we get an efficient protocol for the secure
computation of the median of two subsets x, y ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The communication complex-
ity of this function is O(logn), and the communication of the resulting secure protocol is
polylogarithmic in n times a security parameter.
Circuits with look-up tables The second methodology we suggest uses as its underlying
computational model the circuit for computing f , enhanced with look-up tables. The input
wires to a table define an index and the output equals the value stored in the indexed position.
This model is equivalent to a write-oblivious RAM (random access memory) machine, where
the RAM machine may perform any read operation, but write operations are limited to
be oblivious, in the sense that their time and location does not depend on the input. (In
other words indirection is allowed with read operations but not with write operations. See
discussion in Section 5.)
For a function f whose computation requires a relatively small number of accesses to
tables, the size of a circuit with tables for f may be much smaller than that of a Boolean
circuit, hence the resulting communication costs of the secure function evaluation protocol
may be sublinear in the input size.
Moreover, we show how to simulate RAM (and in particular non-oblivious RAM ma-
chines) via circuits with look-up tables with a moderate cost. This allows the design of a
(insecure) protocol for computing f on a RAM machine, using a high-level programming
language, and then compiling it into a secure protocol.
Again, if f(x, y) can be expressed as h(gA(x), gB(y)) where gA and gB are (efficiently com-
putable) arbitrary functions, and h can be computed in sublinear time on a RAM machine,
we get a sublinear communication secure function evaluation protocol for f .
Combining constructions All our constructions (as well as the garbled circuit transfor-
mation) follow the same convention for representing the inputs and outputs: these values
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are shared between the parties according to a simple secret sharing scheme5. A consequence
is that in many cases all these constructions may be combined in a single protocol. Hence,
we get the following protocol engineering paradigm:
1. Divide a computation into sub-tasks.
2. For each sub-task choose the right computational model (for its insecure computation)
that leads to an efficient representation.
3. Transform each sub-task to get its secure function evaluation protocol.
4. Combine these protocols to get a protocol for the computation.
1.3 Summary of results
We introduce the private Indirect Indexing as well as the Generalized Indirect Indexing
primitives and show (i) secure evaluation protocols for them (Section 3) (ii) How they can
be used to obtain communication preserving protocol for secure evaluation of any function
f(x, y) (Section 4) and (iii) How they may be combined with the secure evaluation of circuits
(Section 5). We give various examples of problems for which our transformations yields more
efficient protocols. In particular we address the millionaires problem – our work provides
more efficient protocols for the problem than previously known, both from a communication
point of view as well as computation (only a polylogarithmic number of OTs).
Most of the paper deals with the semi-honest model of participants. In Section 6 we
discuss a communication efficient method of transforming a protocol in the semi-honest
model into one that works in the malicious model.
2 Preliminaries
In this work we express complexity in terms of the input length and the cryptographic
security parameter6. Let n denote the input length and k the security parameter. We
consider protocols as communication efficient if their communication complexity is no higher
than a polylog(n) · poly(k) factor times the communication of the best insecure protocol for
the same functionality. The security parameter should be selected so that the computational
work done by the parties is insufficient for breaking the cryptographic primitives in use. In
particular any choice of k must satisfy k = ω(logn).
We rely mostly on Goldreich [20, 21] for definitions and notation. In the design and proof
of our protocol we make extensive use of composition theorems for secure protocols. This
has been an active research area (see [11, 20]). An important tool in our design are efficient
protocols for Oblivious Transfer (OT) and Private Information Retrieval (PIR). We briefly
overview OT and PIR as well as some other cryptographic tools we use.
5We use a sharing scheme for bits where a bit is represented by the exclusive or of its shares. Other secret
sharing schemes may also be used with minor changes.
6This is in contrast to a common practice of identifying the security parameter and the input length.
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Notation We use A
c
≡ B to denote computational indistinguishability of ensembles A =
{An}n∈IN and B = {Bn}n∈IN by circuits, so that every family of poly(n)-size circuits has
only a negligible (in n) advantage in distinguishing A and B. We use neg(n) to denote
functions decreasing faster than any inverse polynomial.
The notation a⊕ b is used for the bit-wise exclusive-or of a, b.
2.1 The Semi-Honest Model
In most of this work we address the case were the parties participating in the protocol
are semi-honest i.e. they follow the protocol as prescribed but may record all messages
and subsequently deduce information not derivable solely from the protocol output. Let
f : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ be a (randomized) function. Let P be a two-party
protocol for computing (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) = f(x, y). Denote by view
P
i (x, y) the view of the
ith party during the execution of P on (x, y) (including her private coins and all received
messages) and by outPi (x, y) her outcome (which is implicit in view
P
i (x, y)).
Definition 2.1 (Privacy with respect to semi-honest parties) Protocol P privately
computes
f(x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y))
if there exist probabilistic poly-time simulators S1, S2 such that:
{S1(x, f1(x, y)), f2(x, y)}
c
≡ {(viewP1 (x, y),out
P
2 (x, y))}
{S2(x, f2(x, y)), f1(x, y)}
c
≡ {(viewP2 (x, y),out
P
1 (x, y))}
Composition in the semi-honest model In our constructions we compose protocols
that are private with respect to semi-honest parties, and make use of composition theorems
for secure protocols. In this section we define the notion of private reduction and cite a cor-
responding composition theorem that enables us to phrase out constructions as composition
of protocols. We refer the reader to [20, 11] for further details.
Definition 2.2 (Privately reducing g to f) An oracle-aided protocol using oracle func-
tionality f privately computes g if there exist simulators S1, S2 as in Definition 2.1. The
corresponding views are defined in the natural manner to include oracle answers.
An oracle-aided protocol privately reduces g to f if it privately computes g when using
oracle functionality f .
Theorem 2.1 (Composition in semi-honest model, two parties) Suppose g is pri-
vately reducible to f and there exists a protocol for privately computing f . Then, the protocol
defined by replacing each oracle-call to f by a protocol that privately computes f is a protocol
for privately computing g.
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Forcing semi-honest behavior The semi-honest model is of a benign adversary, that
acts as prescribed in the protocol. On the other hand, a malicious adversary may deviate
arbitrarily from its prescribed protocol. It is known how to transform protocols secure in
the semi-honest model into protocols secure in the malicious model [23] (see also [20]). The
transformation is via a compiler that ‘forces’ the parties to act semi-honestly.
A possible design paradigm for secure protocols is thus first to construct a protocol for
the semi-honest model and then compile it. Alas, when efficiency is a concern, the compiler
is not good enough – in particular it is not communication preserving. In Section 6 we
describe an adjustment of the transformation from protocols for the semi-honest model into
protocols for the malicious model so as to make it communication preserving.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives
We define and discuss the primitives that are used in our constructions. For precise definitions
and constructions we refer the reader to [21].
Pseudo-random generators A pseudo-random generator is a (deterministic) procedure
that transforms a short random seed to a long string that is indistinguishable from a random
one. We use pseudo-random generators to generate (pseudo) random bits for a protocol, with
the cost of communicating only k bits.
Definition 2.3 A pseudo-random generator is a polynomially computable function G : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}poly(n) so that G(Uk)
c
≡ Upoly(n), where U denotes the ensemble of uniform distribu-
tions.
We denote the computational work for computing G(·) by WPRG(k).
Pseudo-random functions A pseudo-random function is a function that is indistin-
guishable from a random function by an adaptive adversary. A function FK : {0, 1}
n →
{0, 1}poly(n) is specified by a short key K of length k bits. For every probabilistic poly-time
Turing machine M , |Pr(MFk(1n) = 1)− Pr(MH(1n) = 1)| ≤ neg(n), where Hn is a random
function mapping n bits to poly(n) bits. The probability is over the selection of k, H and
the random coins of M .
We denote the computational work for computing Fk(x) by WPRF (k).
2.2.1 Oblivious Transfer and Private Information Retrieval
Oblivious Transfer (or OT) is a specific case of secure function evaluation, first suggested
by Rabin, where one party (the sender) has some input and the other party (the chooser)
learns some aspect of the information without ‘hinting’ which aspect of the information was
transferred.
Definition 2.4 (1-out-of-w oblivious transfer) Let x[0], x[1], . . . , x[w−1] be elements
chosen from {0, 1}X. Let j ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1} be an index to one of these elements.
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An oblivious transfer protocol is a protocol that privately computes the function
OTw1 ((x[0], x[1], . . . , x[w − 1]), j) = (⊥, x[j])
The party holding the index j is referred to as the chooser and the party holding the
elements x[0], x[1], . . . , x[w − 1] is the sender.
Oblivious transfer serves as a basic block in our constructions. There are several known
constructions of oblivious transfer protocols that are efficient either in communication or
in computation (see discussion below). To abstract out the dependency on the specific
oblivious transfer protocol in use we express the efficiency of our protocols in terms of its
work and communication denoted WOT(w, k,X) and COT(w, k,X) respectively, where k
is the security parameter. We usually ignore the dependency of WOT and COT on X since
X = O(max(k, logw)). Note that since WOT(w, k,X) = Ω(w) it follows that the security
parameter should be chosen so that k = ω(logw), i.e. that breaking the oblivious transfer
should take much more work than w.
Complexity of OT and PIR A lot of work was devoted recently to the communication
complexity of OT, under the heading of Private Information Retrieval – PIR [6]. The results
on single PIR by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [35] and Cachin et al. [12] solve “half the
problem” by protecting the chooser from the sender (i.e. at the end of the protocol the
sender cannot distinguish which value the chooser has learned), but the chooser may learn
more than a single value. The construction by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky is under the
quadratic residuosity assumption. This was the first sublinear communication protocol for
PIR with a single database. The scheme by Cachin et al. is under the φ-hiding assumption
and is more efficient in terms of communication. The communication complexity of their
construction is k · polylog(n). 7
In order to protect the sender as well, Naor and Pinkas [41] proposed a method that turns
any computational PIR into an OTw1 protocol, by applying logw times (concurrently) an OT
2
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protocol, without increasing the communication complexity otherwise. Furthermore, they
described recently an OTw1 protocol based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assump-
tion [42]. In their protocol the chooser performs a constant number of exponentiations and
the sender performs O(w) exponentiations, while the communication complexity is increased
by a single element in addition to a PIR scheme8. (They also provided work/communication
tradeoffs for the problem, which may be relevant in some cases.)
We summarize that under the appropriate assumptions9 there is an 1-out-of-w oblivious
transfer protocol whose communication complexity is proportional to the security parameter
plus the size of an element. If one is interested in a low computational protocol, then the
overhead can be as little as one exponentiation plus w private-key operations, using the first
scheme in [42].
7Recently, Kiayias and Yung [37] presented a new polylogarithmic communication PIR scheme.
8A similar construction was suggested by Aiello, Ishai and Reingold [1].
9Φ-hiding for the PIR scheme [12], and DDH for [42].
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Counting oblivious transfers The cost of many secure function evaluation protocols
is dominated by the cost of the oblivious transfer invocations. Intuitively, the number of
oblivious transfer invocations is a good measure for the efficiency of a protocol.
Beaver [4] showed that it is possible to implement poly(k) oblivious transfers from an
initial “seed” of just k oblivious transfers, assuming only the existence of one-way functions
(where k is a security parameter). This construction is not efficient since it relies on the
secure function evaluation of a pseudo-random generator.
Beaver’s result implies that in the computational setting (i) in general, specifying the
number of oblivious transfer invocation in a protocol is not a sufficient measure for its
complexity, and (ii) one cannot hope to obtain a high lower bound (say above logarithmic)
on the number of oblivious transfers invocations needed to securely evaluate a functionality.
Nevertheless, in the protocols discussed in this work, the number of oblivious transfer
invocations is a dominating factor in complexity.
2.3 Garbled circuit secure function evaluation
Many of the works in the field of secure function evaluation followed the ‘garbled circuit’
construction introduced by Yao [49, 50] and [23]. The idea of the construction is to emulate
the (Boolean) circuit for computing f gate by gate (once all the ‘garbled’ inputs to a gate
are known its ‘garbled’ output may be computed).
The cost of the protocol (e.g. as described in [20]) is of invoking one OT for each wire of
the circuit. In a more efficient variant, described e.g. in [43], the cost is that of invoking one
OT21 for each input bit plus a constant number of pseudo-random function evaluations per
each gate. I.e. the computational work is n ·WOT (2, k)+s ·WPRF (k) and the communication
is n·COT (2, k)+O(sk). In Appendix A we apply the garbled circuit construction to a protocol
for computing f (this protocol may leak information but the transformed protocol should
not). We give a variant of the garbled circuit transformation that results with computational
work c ·WOT (2, k) + s ·WPRF (k) and communication c · COT (2, k) + O(sk) where c is the
communication complexity of the related (insecure) protocol.
3 Indirect Indexing
In the following we describe a primitive called private indirect indexing that will serve as a
basic building block in all our constructions. The indirect indexing primitive is similar to
the oblivious transfer primitive in the sense that in both primitives an indexed array entry is
retrieved. The difference is that in the oblivious transfer primitive one party knows the input
index j and learns the indexed element y[j] (and the other party learns nothing) whereas in
the indirect indexing primitive the input index j and the output y[j] are shared between the
parties so that (i) the input index is a combination of the parties input shares, and (ii) the
protocol results in the parties holding random shares of the indexed element.
Notation We use a simple sharing scheme for the inputs and outputs of the indirect
indexing primitive. If Alice and Bob hold as shares of α the strings π, π˜ respectively, then
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the shared value is α = π ⊕ π˜. It follows that π˜ = α⊕ π hence we abuse notation and write
the shares as π, α⊕ π (equivalently α⊕ π˜, π˜).
Let y¯ be an array of w values and j be an index of an element y[j] of y¯. The inputs for
Alice and Bob are shares π ⊕ j, π of the index j. The outputs of Alice and Bob are random
shares π′, π′ ⊕ y[j] of y[j]. More formally:
Definition 3.1 (Private indirect indexing) Let y¯ = y[0], y[1], . . . , y[w − 1] be a list of
w values where y[i] ∈ {0, 1}Y and w is an integral power of 2. Let j ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1} be an
index to an element of y¯.
A private indirect indexing protocol (from Alice to Bob) is a protocol PIndAB that privately
computes the function
IndAB (π ⊕ j, (π, y¯)) = ((π
′ ⊕ y[j]), π′)
where π ∈ {0, 1}logw and π′ ∈R {0, 1}
Y .
Similarly, the protocol PIndBA is defined to privately compute the function
IndBA ((π, x¯), π ⊕ j)) = (π
′, π′ ⊕ x[j])
where π ∈ {0, 1}logw and π′ ∈R {0, 1}
X.
Note 3.1 The initial string π ∈ {0, 1}logw may be chosen arbitrarily. Further, π does not
have to be chosen explicitly. In particular, π may be chosen so that π = 0logw (in such a
case Alice knows the input index j), or so that π ⊕ j = 0logw (in which case Bob knows the
input index j).
On the other hand the string π′, in the outcome of the protocol, must be selected uniformly
at random from {0, 1}Y i.e. neither Alice nor Bob learn new information about Y [j].
Note 3.2 An equivalent definition is IndAB (π ⊕ j, (π, y¯)) = (π˜, (π˜ ⊕ y[j])) where π˜ ∈R
{0, 1}Y .
We now describe a private indirect indexing protocol. The idea underlying our construc-
tion is to use an OTw1 protocol where Alice acts as the chooser and Bob the sender. Since
Alice does not know which index she should choose, Bob permutes the locations of his inputs
according to π. He also encrypts his inputs using a random string π′. This allows Alice to
select the right position, without figuring out the “real” value she has received. In more
detail:
Construction 3.1 (Private indirect indexing protocol (from Alice to Bob))
Let PIndAB (π ⊕ j, (π, y[0], y[1], . . . , y[w − 1])) be the following protocol:
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Input: Alice’s input is a permuted index J = π⊕j. Bob has as input y¯ = y[0], y[1], . . . , y[w−
1] and π ∈ {0, 1}logw.
Step 1: Bob chooses π′ ∈R {0, 1}
Y and sets Y [π ⊕ i] = π′ ⊕ y[i] for 0 ≤ i < w.
Step 2: Alice and Bob use an OTw1 protocol on inputs J, (Y [0],Y [1], . . . ,Y [w − 1]) so that
Alice learns J ′ = Y [J ].
Output: Alice locally outputs J ′. Bob locally outputs π′.
The protocol PIndBA ((π, x[0], x[1], . . . , x[w − 1]), π ⊕ j) is constructed symmetrically.
Claim 3.1 PIndAB privately computes the function IndAB with communication costs COT (w, k, Y ),
computation costs O(WOT (w, k, Y )) and round complexity of the oblivious transfer protocol.
Proof First we show that the protocol outputs the correct output. Bob locally outputs π′
for a randomly selected π′. Alice locally outputs J ′ = Y [J ] = π′ ⊕ y[j].
As for privacy with respect to semi-honest participants, we show that protocol PIndAB
privately reduces IndAB to OT
w
1 . By Theorem 2.1 this proves the claim. Let Alice’s output
be π′ ⊕ y[j] and Bob’s output be π′ as in the protocol. We now construct simulators S1, S2
in accordance with Definition 2.1. The input to simulator S1 consists of π⊕ j and a random
number π˜ ∈R {0, 1}
Y (corresponding to π′ ⊕ y[j]). The simulator outputs π˜. Similarly, the
input to simulator S2 consists of π, y[0], y[1], . . . , y[w − 1] and a random π
′. The simulator
outputs π′. ✷
A simple usage example We can now sequentially compose PIndAB and PIndBA to get
higher levels of indirect indexing. We begin with an example – the function Ind that performs
two levels of indirect indexing.
Let x¯ = x[0], x[1], . . . , x[wx− 1] and y¯ = y[0], y[1], . . . , y[wy− 1] where wx, wy are integral
powers of 2. Define
Ind((j, x¯), y¯) = (x[y[j]],⊥)
where j is an index to the y list (i.e. 0 ≤ j < wy), each y[i] is an index to the x list (i.e.
0 ≤ y[i] < wx) and x[i] ∈ {0, 1}
X.
The protocol for Ind first invokes the protocol for computing IndAB (on inputs j, y¯) after
which Alice and Bob share y[j] and then invokes the protocol for IndBA (on inputs x¯ and
these shares) so that they share x[y[j]]. In the last step, Bob sends Alice his share of the
output so that Alice may locally output x[y[j]].
Construction 3.2 Let PInd((j, x¯), y¯) be the following protocol:
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Inputs: Alice has input x¯ = x[0], x[1], . . . , x[wx − 1] and an index j. Bob’s input is a list of
indices y¯ = y[0], y[1], . . . , y[wy − 1].
Step 1: Alice and Bob jointly compute (π˜, π˜ ⊕ j′) = PIndAB(j, (0
logwy , y¯)).
Step 2: Alice and Bob jointly compute (π˜′ ⊕ j′′, π˜′) = PIndBA((π˜, x¯), π˜ ⊕ j
′).
step 3: Bob sends π˜′ to Alice that locally outputs j′′.
Claim 3.2 PInd privately computes the function Ind.
Proof It is easy to see that j′′ = x[y[j]], hence the outcome of the protocol is (x[y[j]],⊥)
as required.
We show that protocol PInd privately reduces Ind to IndAB and IndBA. By Theorem 2.1
this proves the claim. Construct simulators S1, S2 in accordance with Definition 2.1 as
follows:
The input to simulator S1 contains x¯ the index j and the outcome x[y[j]]. S1 selects
π˜ ∈R {0, . . . , wx} and π˜
′ ∈R {0, 1}
X and outputs (i) π˜ (this corresponds to the response
Alice gets from the PIndAB oracle in Step 1) and (ii) π˜
′ ⊕ x[y[j]] (this corresponds to the
response Alice gets from the PIndBA oracle in Step 2).
The input to simulator S2 is y¯. S2 selects π˜ ∈R {0, . . . , wx} and π˜
′ ∈R {0, 1}
X and
outputs (i) π˜ (this corresponds to the response Bob gets from the PIndAB oracle in Step 1)
and (ii) π˜′ (this corresponds to the response Bob gets from the PIndAB oracle in Step 2). ✷
Note 3.3 Running protocol PInd without Step 3 results in both parties holding shares of
x[y[j]]. To change the protocol so that Bob learns the output, Step 3 should be modified so
that Alice sends her share to Bob.
3.1 Generalized Indirect Indexing
We now generalize our usage of PIndAB and PIndBA to have c levels of indirect indexing,
where the indices alternate between the parties (this is a secure analog to pointer jump-
ing). The inputs to the generalized indirect indexing function GInd are indices ordered in
c lists10: y¯1, x¯2, y¯3, x¯4, . . . , y¯c−1, x¯c. Let xˆ = x¯2, x¯4 . . . , x¯c denote the lists held by Alice and
yˆ = y¯1, y¯3, . . . , y¯c−1 denote the lists held by Bob. For odd 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c−1 the list y¯ℓ contains wℓ
elements yℓ[0], yℓ[1], . . . , yℓ[wℓ − 1] where 0 ≤ yℓ[i] < wℓ+1. Similarly, for even 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c the
list x¯ℓ contains wℓ elements xℓ[0], xℓ[1], . . . , xl[wℓ − 1] where 0 ≤ xℓ[i] < wℓ+1 for ℓ 6= c (i.e.
entries of y¯ℓ may serve as indices to x¯ℓ+1 and, similarly, entries of x¯ℓ may serve as indices to
y¯ℓ+1), and xc[i] ∈ {0, 1}
Xc.
The initial index 0 ≤ j0 < w1 is shared between Alice and bob so that Alice holds π0⊕ j0
and Bob holds π0. The outcome of GInd is xc[yc−1[· · · [x2[y1[j0]]] · · ·]] shared by both parties.
See Figure 1.
10Without loss of generality we assume c to be even.
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Figure 1: Demonstration of GInd. Alice holds xˆ = x¯2, x¯4 . . . , x¯c and Bob holds yˆ =
y¯1, y¯3, . . . , y¯c−1. The outcome is xc[yc−1[· · · [x2[y1[j0]]] · · ·]] shared between Alice and Bob.
The intermediate indices j1, . . . , jc are not revealed to any of the parties.
Definition 3.2 (Private general indirect indexing) For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c let
jℓ =
{
yℓ[jℓ−1] if ℓ ≤ c is odd
xℓ[jℓ−1] if ℓ ≤ c is even
Then
GInd((π ⊕ j0, xˆ), (π, yˆ)) = (π
′ ⊕ jℓ, π
′)
where π′ ∈R {0, 1}
Xc.
A private general indirect indexing protocol is a protocol that privately computes the
function GInd.
The construction of PGInd is similar to that of PInd (Construction 3.2). It uses PIndAB
and PIndBA alternately. In more detail:
Construction 3.3 Let PGInd((π ⊕ j0, xˆ), (π, yˆ)) be the following protocol:
Inputs: Alice’s input is xˆ = x¯2, x¯4 . . . , x¯c and a masked index π ⊕ j0. Bob’s input is yˆ =
y¯1, y¯3, . . . , y¯c−1 and the string π. Let π0 = π.
Step 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c− 1 odd: Alice and Bob jointly compute
(πℓ, πℓ ⊕ jℓ) = PIndAB(πℓ−1 ⊕ jℓ−1, (πℓ−1, y¯ℓ)).
Step 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c even: Alice and Bob jointly compute
(πℓ ⊕ jℓ, πℓ) = PIndBA((πℓ−1, x¯ℓ), πℓ−1(jℓ−1)).
The proof of correctness and privacy is similar to that of claims 3.1 and 3.2. Using the
notation of Section 2.2.1 we get:
Theorem 3.3 Protocol PGInd privately computes function GInd with work O(
∑c
ℓ=1WOT(wℓ, k))
and communication O(
∑c
ℓ=1COT(wℓ, k)).
13
4 Communication Preserving Protocols
As a consequence of Theorem 3.3 we give two transformation from (insecure) protocols
into communication preserving secure function evaluation protocols. These transformations
formulate our first design methodology for secure function evaluation protocols, and we
demonstrate how to apply them to several examples.
Overview of the section We begin by considering protocols in the communication com-
plexity model (for a more detailed account of the model see [34]). Applying Theorem 3.3 to
such protocols (represented by communication complexity trees) we get our main theorem – a
communication preserving transformation into secure function evaluation protocols. A naive
application of our transformation to protocols may result in protocols with super-polynomial
work. Hence, we give a variant of our main theorem using a possibly more succinct repre-
sentation, by oblivious branching programs, that allows for less work. Our transformations
are formulated with deterministic protocols. We discuss how to use randomized protocols
with these transformation, using fairly standard tools from communication complexity and
cryptography. Application examples are given throughout the section.
4.1 Communication Complexity Protocols
Intuitively, communication complexity protocols are protocols between two parties who wish
to evaluate a function of their joint input. They engage in a protocol, where they alternately
send single bit messages11. The protocol results in the computation of the function by
one of the parties (or both). The main issue in the communication complexity model is
efficiency, in terms of the amount of communication needed to jointly compute the function.
We emphasize that security is not an issue in this model, and will be introduced by our
transformations.
Assume two players, Alice and Bob, wish to evaluate f(x, y) where Alice’s input is x and
Bob’s input is y. Without loss of generality we assume that Alice sends the first message
of the protocol. Note that her input x determines her message. Furthermore, her input
determines her next message for any sequence of messages she may get from Bob. Similarly,
Bob’s input y determines his next message for any message sequence he may get from Alice.
Hence, upon seeing their respective inputs Alice and Bob may choose their next message for
any possible message sequence. Note that this may be done before the protocol is actually
run. We note that in the protocols we deal with, the number of messages sent by Alice and
Bob depends only on the input length n (and not on the actual value of x, y).
The layout of the protocol is of a full binary tree, where every internal node v is labeled by
a function (av(·) or bv(·)), and every leaf v is labeled by a value zv. Every node v corresponds
to a possible message sequence in the natural manner, according to the path from the root
to v (i.e. choosing a left edge corresponds to sending the message “0”, choosing a right edge
corresponds to sending the message “1”). Following our convention that Alice sends the first
message, she controls the tree edges from even to odd depth nodes, and Bob controls the
11The case where the parties send longer messages is analogous assuming the protocol is oblivious in the
sense that for every round the number of bits that are sent does not depend on the input (x, y).
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other edges. Upon seeing her input, Alice decides for each internal node v of even depth
whether to choose a right or left edge. This choice is reflected in the definition below by the
functions av applied to Alice’s input x. Similarly, Bob decides for each internal node v of
odd depth whether to choose a right or a left edge. This is reflected in the definition by the
functions bv applied to Bob’s input y. Each leaf v is assigned a value zv, and the outcome
of the protocol is the value of the leaf that is reached by the alternate choices of Alice and
Bob. More formally:
Definition 4.1 (Communication complexity model) A protocol PCC, in the commu-
nication complexity model, over domain X × Y with range Z is a full binary tree of even
height where (i) Each internal node v of even depth is labeled with a function av : X → {0, 1},
(ii) Each internal node v of odd depth is labeled with function bv : Y → {0, 1}, and (iii) Each
leaf v is labeled with an element zv ∈ Z.
The value of the protocol PCC on input (x, y) is the label zv of the leaf reached by starting
at the root, and walking on the tree, according to the functions av, bv. The protocol computes
f : X × Y → Z if its value on input (x, y) equals f(x, y). The cost c of PCC is the height of
the tree.
Note that the labels av(·), bv(·) and zv are known a-priori to both parties. The outcome
of av(x) and bv(y) is computable by Alice and Bob respectively upon seeing their input.
To actually run the protocol, Alice constructs (perhaps implicitly) from PCC the labeled
sub-tree induced by her input, by hard-wiring the choices av(x) for edges from even to odd
depth nodes. Similarly, Bob hard-wires the choices bv(y) for edges from odd to even depth
nodes.
4.1.1 Example: A protocol for the Hamming distance
We consider a concrete example – a protocol for computing the Hamming distance of two
n-bit strings x, y (i.e. the number of locations i such that xi 6= yi). The protocol proceeds
as follows. Alice sends her input x to Bob bit by bit starting with x0. For each bit xi of x
Bob receives he checks whether yi agrees with xi. Bob replies with a 0-message if yi = xi
and with a 1-message if yi 6= xi. At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob may compute
the Hamming distance of x, y by counting the number of 1-messages sent by Bob. The cost
of the protocol is of c = 2n single bit messages.
The protocol tree We give a more formal description of the protocol tree. We label
every node v of the tree in the natural manner – with a binary number corresponding to
the sequence of left (0) and right (1) edges on the path from the root to v (intuitively, this
corresponds to a sequence of single bit messages σ0, σ1, . . . leading to v). The root is labeled
ǫ. We now define the functions av(·), bv(·) and the values zv. The functions av determine
Alice’s messages, hence, for every internal node of even depth v = σ0, . . . , σ2i−1 we set
av(x) = xi.
This setting of av corresponds to Alice sending the bit xi. Similarly, the functions bv deter-
mine Bob’s messages. Here the situation is slightly more complicated since Bob’s messages
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depend on the last message sent by Alice and on his input. Hence, for every internal node
of odd depth v = σ0, . . . , σ2i we set
bv(y) =
{
0 if yi = σ2i
1 otherwise
This setting of bv corresponds to Bob sending a 0-message if yi = xi and a 1-message
otherwise. Finally we define the leaf values zv to count the number of 1-messages sent by
Bob and let
zv =
n−1∑
i=0
σ2i+1
for every leaf v = σ0, . . . , σ2n−1. Figure 2 (i) displays the protocol layout for two-bit inputs.
The nodes are numbered from left to right, corresponding to the labels above.
Note 4.1 We emphasize that the protocol tree, as described above, is ‘fixed’ in the sense that
it does not depend on the actual inputs of the parties. In particular, we may assume that the
protocol tree is agreed upon and known to both parties prior to running the protocol.
Running the protocol We separate the running of the protocol into two stages12 prepro-
cessing and communication, as follows:
In the preprocessing stage, Alice and Bob make their decisions for the entire protocol
by computing av(x) and bv(y) respectively. We emphasize that no communication is needed
for this computation, since each party computes functions of its input alone. The outcome
of the computation is that each party holds an induced subtree of the protocol tree, where
Alice removes from her tree the edges not chosen by the functions av(x), and Bob removes
those not chosen by bv(y). Figures 2 (ii) and (iii) show Alice’s subtree for the input x = 01
and Bob’s subtree for the input y = 11.
Note 4.2 In the following we do not give an explicit account of the computational work
needed for computing av(x) and bv(y). It can be checked, however, that this work is feasible
for all our examples.
In the communication stage, Alice and Bob follow a path from the root to a leaf in their
subtrees. The first edge is determined by Alice’s subtree – it is the (only) edge exiting the root
in her subtree. Alice sends a 0-message if this edge is a left edge and a 1-message otherwise.
The path continues by alternately following the edges in Bob’s and Alice’s subtree, until a
leaf is reached. The outcome of the protocol is the leaf value.
As an example, consider the actual run of the Hamming distance protocol on inputs 01
and 11. Alice’s first message is aε(01) = 0, this corresponds to sending her first bit. Bob’s
reply is b0(11) = 1, i.e. a disagreement. Alice then sends a10(01) = 1 (her second bit) and
Bob replies b110(11) = 0 (agreement) and the outcome is z0110 = 1. Note how this actual run
is reflected in the subtrees held by Alice and Bob: Alice’s first message corresponds to the
12This separation into two stages is not required in an actual run of the protocol.
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Figure 2: Protocol for computing the Hamming distance of x, y.
(left) edge exiting the root in (i); Both Alice and Bob know now that node 0 of depth 1 was
reached. Bob’s reply corresponds to the (right) edge exiting this node in (ii), reaching node
1 of depth 2. Alice’s second message then corresponds to the (right) edge exiting this node
in (i), reaching node 3 of depth 3. Finally Bob’s last message corresponds to the (left) edge
exiting this node in (ii), reaching a leaf labeled 1 (the protocol outcome).
4.2 Secure function evaluation based on the communication com-
plexity tree
We now turn to translate the problem of evaluating a protocol PCC into an instance of
GInd, hence resulting in a secure evaluation protocol for PCC . Let PCC be a protocol for
computing f in the communication complexity model, with cost c. For every node v in level
17
ℓ let n(v) be its position from the left (i.e. for the leftmost node on the ℓth level n(v) = 0
and for the rightmost n(v) = 2ℓ − 1). We now reduce the problem of computing PCC to the
problem of general indirect indexing. The idea of the reduction is that one can view any
odd step ℓ of a protocol in the communication complexity model as if Alice chooses from the
2ℓ labels induced by Bob’s input, followed by Bob choosing from the 2ℓ+1 labels induced by
Alice’s input. The choices are made based on the transcript of the protocol so far and the
bits Alice and Bob send in step ℓ. The protocol PCC reduces to an instance of GInd with
c levels, where the ℓth level has an array of size wℓ = 2
ℓ, whose values are the labels of the
corresponding nodes in the tree.
The parties represent their subtrees by a sequence of lists y¯1, x¯2, y¯3, x¯4 . . . , y¯c−1, x¯c, and
an initial index j.
• Bob’s subtree is represented by the lists y¯1, y¯3, . . . , y¯c−1 as follows:
– For a node v being the ith node of (odd) depth ℓ, let yℓ[i] be the node (of depth
l + 1) that is reached by taking the edge exiting from v in Bob’s subgraph.
• Alice’s subtree is represented by j, x¯2, x¯4, . . . , x¯c−2 as follows:
– The initial index j equals the node (of depth 1) reached by the taking the edge
exiting the root in Alice’s subtree.
– For a node v being the ith node of (even) depth ℓ, let xℓ[i] be the node (of depth
l + 1) that is reached by taking the edge exiting from v in Alice’s subgraph.
• The leaf values are represented by the list x¯c as follows:
– For a node v being the ith leaf let xc[i] = zv.
It follows that going by the lists, starting with the initial index j we get the outcome of the
protocol
xc[yc−1[· · · [x2[y1[j]] · · ·]].
Construction 4.1 (Private computation of PCC) Let P
priv
CC (x, y) be the following
protocol:
Inputs: Alice holds input x ∈ X . Bob holds input y ∈ Y .
Step 1: Let wℓ = 2
ℓ.
Alice sets j = aroot(x). For all nodes v in even level 2 ≤ ℓ < c she sets xℓ[n(v)] =
2n(v) + av(x). For all leaves v she sets xc[n(v)] = z(v).
For all nodes v in odd level 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ c− 1 Bob sets yℓ[n(v)] = 2n(v) + bv(y).
Step 2: Alice and bob run protocol PGInd on ((j, xˆ), yˆ) where xˆ = x¯2, x¯4, . . . , x¯c and yˆ =
y¯1, y¯3, . . . , y¯c−1.
We conclude the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 Let PCC be a protocol in the communication complexity model computing
f : X × Y → Z with cost c. Then there exists a protocol PprivCC privately computing f with
O(c) rounds, O(c · COT(2
c, k)) communication and O(WOT(2
c, k)) work.
Note 4.3 Theorem 4.1 holds also for the case where the parties are not limited to sending
a single bit at every round, as long as the number of bits sent at each round does not depend
on the inputs of the parties. Therefore one can also have a round preserving protocol.
Example Applying the Construction 4.1 to the Hamming distance protocol in Figure 2
we get:
j = 0
y¯1 = [1, 2]
x¯2 = [1, 3, 5, 7]
y¯3 = [1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14]
x¯4 = [0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2].
Going through the lists we get:
x4[y3[x2[y1[j]]]] = x4[y3[x2[y1[0]]]] = x4[y3[x2[1]]] = x4[y3[3]] = x4[6] = 1.
4.2.1 Simple applications
Computing the median Assume Alice and Bob hold subsets x, y of {1, . . . , n}. They
would like to compute the median of the multi-set x ∪ y. There exists a protocol for the
median problem with communication complexity O(logn) (due to M. Karchmer, see [34] Ex.
1.7). Hence Theorem 4.1 yields a communication preserving protocol for the median, with
polynomial work.
We give a short description of the protocol. For simplicity, we assume that x and y have
the same size m, which is a power of 2. The protocol runs in O(logn) steps. Alice and Bob
maintain subsets of x, y so that their size is cut by half at every step as follows. Let xi, yi
be the subsets of x, y in the ith step. Denote the medians of xi, yi by ma, mb. To reduce the
size of their subsets, Alice and Bob compare ma, mb. If ma = mb then the median is found.
Otherwise, Alice and Bob reduce the sizes of their sets by half. If ma < mb Alice removes
the smallest elements of her set and Bob removes the greatest elements of his set. Similarly,
if ma > mb, Alice removes the greatest elements of her set and Bob removes the smallest
elements of his set.
The crux of the protocol is an efficient comparison of ma, mb so that the total commu-
nication cost is O(logn). The medians ma, mb are compared single bit at a time starting
from the high order bits, stopping on a bit j where ma[j], mb[j] disagree. We will show that
the high order bits should not be exchanged in the following steps of the protocols, resulting
with a protocol with logarithmic communication complexity. Consider for example the case
ma < mb. After removing the half smallest element in her set, all the remaining elements in
Alice’s set have the same high order bits as ma, hence Alice does not have to re-send them
in the following steps. A similar argument holds for the remaining elements in Bob’s subset.
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Comparing (deterministic) strategies Let G be some combinatorial game that takes
d steps and assume that Alice and Bob each have a (deterministic) strategy for G, explicitly
described as a binary game tree of depth d and total size n = 2d. They wish to determine
whose strategy is winning, without revealing to the other party any other information. To
decide whose strategy is winning they may play the game for d steps (and d bits of com-
munication). However, this reveals more than they want. A protocol based on a circuit for
comparing the strategies results in costs of invoking an OT21 protocol Ω(n) times. On the
other hand, a protocol in the communication complexity model for comparing the strategies
has cost proportional to the depth d of the tree and hence the communication costs if such
a protocol is O(d · COT(n, k)) and the work is O(d ·WOT(n, k)).
4.3 Oblivious Branching Program Protocols
One problem with the explicit description of a function by its communication complexity
tree is that the amount of work done by the two parties is proportional to 2c, which can be
large, once the communication c is super-logarithmic. We therefore consider a representation
of a protocol that may allow for less work, by restricting the amount of information needed
to be stored to execute the protocol. The communication tree of Definition 4.1 gives for each
participant a tree, induced by its input. Suppose that instead of a tree each participant has
a DAG, or an oblivious branching program, i.e. all equivalent nodes of a given level (in the
sense that there is no input of the other party that is consistent with the current state and
that will make the two nodes decide a different value for the function) are merged into one
node. The important parameter is the width w, the maximum number of nodes at a level,
of the resulting program13.
It is possible to define the branching program model as if each party holds a branching
program (represented by a labeled layered directed graph) determined by his input. Instead,
we give a definition which is a bit more convenient to convert into a secure protocol. In our
definition the parties maintain a single branching program, where Alice controls the edges
from even depth to odd depth, and Bob controls the edges from odd depth to even depth
(this is similar to our definition of the communication complexity tree). 14 Note that any
protocol PCC of communication complexity c and width 2
c as defined above can be put in
the form of Definition 4.2 below with similar width and cost.
Definition 4.2 (Oblivious branching program model) A protocol PBP , in the (obliv-
ious) branching program model, over domain X×Y with range Z is a layered directed graph
G = (V = (L0, L1, L2, . . . , Lc), E) of even depth c where (i) |L0| = 1, (ii) Each internal node
v in layer of even depth ℓ < c is labeled with a function av : X → Lℓ+1, (iii) Each internal
node v in layer of odd depth ℓ < c is labeled with a function bv : Y → Lℓ+1, and (iii) Each
node in Lc is labeled with an element z ∈ Z.
13Beame et al [10] proposed a different notion of communicating branching programs - they charged the
participants for access to their own input as well, whereas in our case this is “for free.”
14The resulting width in our definition may be in the worst case the square of the width in the model
where each party holds a branching program. However, parties often “share” states, hence the width is much
lower.
20
The value of the protocol PBP on input (x, y) is the leaf reached by starting at the single
element of L0 and walking on the graph according to the functions av, bv. The protocol
computes f : X × Y → Z if its value on input (x, y) equals f(x, y). The cost of PBP is c,
its width is max |Lℓ|.
We now use use our generalized indirect indexing protocol to privately compute PBP .
The construction is similar to that of PprivCC . In the following the function n(·) enumerates
states so that {n(v)|v ∈ Lℓ} = {0, . . . , |Lℓ| − 1}.
Construction 4.2 (Private computation of PBP ) Let P
priv
BP (x, y) be the following
protocol:
Inputs: Alice holds input x ∈ X . Bob holds input y ∈ Y .
Step 1: Let wℓ = |Lℓ|.
Alice sets j = aroot(x) where root is the single element in L0. For all nodes v in even
level ℓ < c she sets xℓ[n(v)] = n[av(x)]. For all leaves v she sets xc[n(v)] = z(v).
For all nodes v in odd level ℓ Bob sets yℓ[n(v)] = n[bv(y)].
Step 2: Alice and bob run protocol PGInd.
Theorem 4.2 Let PBP be a protocol in the branching program model computing f : X×Y →
Z with cost c and width w. Then there exists a protocol PPRIVBP privately computing f with
O(c) rounds, O(c · COT(w, k)) communication and O(c ·WOT(w, k)) work.
Comparing Strings We give a fairly detailed construction of a string comparison branch-
ing program protocol. On input two w-bit strings x, y, let f = 1 if x = y and f = 0 otherwise.
Figure 3 (i) depicts a branching program computing f corresponding to the protocol where
Alice and Bob exchange their strings, one bit at a time. The branching program checks
whether Alice and Bob disagree some bit. Once a disagreement is found (i.e. xℓ 6= yℓ), the
program moves into a ‘trap’ state that leads, eventually, to the leaf labeled 0. Otherwise the
leaf labeled 1 is reached. For inputs x = 1101 and y = 1010, Figure 3 (ii) and (iii) shows the
corresponding branching programs held by Alice and Bob.
Note 4.4 In a typical usage, the strings x, y are hashed prior to applying the branching
program of Figure 3, where the hash function is selected in the clear (see discussion in
Section 4.4.1 and usage in Section 4.5.1).
Acceptance by an automaton Alice holds an deterministic finite automaton A = (Q, δ)
where Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qn} and δ : Q × {0, 1} → Q. Bob holds a string α ∈ {0, 1}
c. They
wish to decide whether α is accepted by A (i.e. whether α reaches qn starting from q0).
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Figure 3: Branching program protocol for string comparison
Define a branching program based on A with cost O(c) and width O(n) (this branching
program is degenerate in the sense that it is completely defined by Alice). The program
considers a single bit of α at a time and stores the state reached by the prefix of α. Let
L0 = {q0} and Li = Q for 0 < i ≤ c. Label node qn in Lc as 1 and all other nodes as 0. For
each node q ∈ Li, the function aq is defined to be aq(·) = δ(q, ·). It is easy to see that the
branching program decides whether A accepts α.
4.4 The Randomized Case
The use of randomized protocols allows, in many interesting cases, to reduce the communica-
tion complexity of protocols to be below linear in the input size. We present two approaches
that allow the use of such protocols with theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The approaches differ in
their treatment of random coins. In one, the random bits are revealed to both parties, and
in the other they are kept secret from the parties.
In the revealed random bits approach (Lemma 4.3) we start with a protocol with a very
small probability of error and ‘derandomize’ it by selecting random coins (independent of
the input) and ‘hard-wiring’ them into the protocol. Theorem 4.1 (or Theorem 4.2) is then
applied to the ‘derandomized’ protocol. In secret random bits approach we start with a
protocol with low randomness.15 The protocol is changed to a new protocol where each
party initially holds a share of the random string (according to some secret sharing scheme).
The protocol first retrieves the random string and then executes the original protocol with
respect to this string. Theorem 4.1 or Theorem 4.2 may be applied to this protocol to obtain
a private one. A drawback of this approach is that in general it results with super polynomial
work protocols.
15Lemma 4.4 serves as a standard tool to reduce the randomness of every protocol to be roughly logarithmic
in n and in the error probability.
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Our examples in Section 4.5 exemplify a design paradigm that combines both approaches.
We compute a function in ‘parts’, so that (i) each part has an efficient private implementation
(ii) at the end of each part the parties share only a small amount of secret random bits (needed
e.g. to conceal intermediate results), and (iii) the overall computation, given the outputs of
all parts is private and efficient.
We begin by a brief introduction of randomized protocols. We refer the reader to [34] for
a detailed account of randomized protocols.
A private-coin randomized protocol is a protocol as in Definitions 4.1 or Definition 4.2
in which Alice has access to a random string rA and Bob has access to a random string rB.
The two strings are chosen independently uniformly at random. In the tree (or branching
program) defining the protocol Alice’s nodes are labeled by functions av of x and rA; Bob’s
nodes are labeled by functions bv of y and rB. A public-coin randomized protocol is defined
similarly where both Alice and Bob has access to the same random string r. We now define
what it means for a protocol to compute a function.
Definition 4.3 Let P,P ′ be private-coin and public-coin randomized protocols respectively.
P computes a function f with error ε if PrrA,rB [P((x, rA), (y, rB)) = f(x, y)] ≥ 1−ε for every
(x, y). Similarly, P ′ computes a function f with error ε if Prr[P
′((x, r), (y, r)) = f(x, y)] ≥
1− ε for every (x, y).
4.4.1 Revealed random bits transformation
We now turn to describe our revealed random bits transformation from randomized protocols
to private protocols. We first observe that if the probability of error is negligible, then the
randomized case is not significantly different than the deterministic case. As long as Alice
and Bob choose their random coins independently of the input, the chances of choosing
‘bad’ coins so that the protocol outcome differs from f are negligible. Note that even if
Alice and Bob know the random string with which the protocol runs, they do not gain any
significant information (in a computational sense) from it. It follows that Alice and Bob
may ‘derandomize’ the protocol by choosing a random string and ‘hard-wiring’ it into the
protocol. To save on communication they select a short random seed and expand it using a
pseudo-random generator. The work and communication of the resulting protocol are similar
to those obtained by theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
Lemma 4.3 Let P be a randomized protocol computing (deterministic) function f : X×Y →
Z with cost c and negligible error probability. Let G be a pseudo-random generator as in
Definition 2.3. Then there exists a protocol P ′ privately computing f with costs as in theorems
4.1 and 4.2 plus the cost of communicating k random bits.
Proof The construction of P ′ is based on the observation that the outcome of P is compu-
tationally close to the outcome of an ideal deterministic procedure that correctly computes
f . It follows that if both Alice and Bob ‘hard-wire’ pseudo-random coins into the protocol,
then with extremely high probability none of them will learn from the outcome of the in-
duced protocol more than it is possible to learn from the outcome of the ideal procedure. It
is possible to apply Theorem 4.1 or Theorem 4.2 on the induced protocol to get a private
protocol.
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We privately reduce f to PprivCC (or to P
priv
BP ). By Theorem 2.1 this proves the lemma.
Let G be a pseudo-random generator. Consider the following protocol:
Construction 4.3
Step 1: Alice selects a seed s ∈R {0, 1}
k for G and sends s to Bob. The string r = G(s)
defines the private and public coins and induce a deterministic protocol Pr where
arv(x) = av(x, r) and b
r
v(y) = bv(y, r).
step 2: Alice and Bob apply Theorem 4.1 (or Theorem 4.2) on Pr.
Construct a simulator S1 for Alice in accordance with Definition 2.1. Note that with
extremely high probability (over the choice of r), the outcome of the protocol is (π⊕f(x, y), π)
as required. Thus we can assume the input of S1 to be x, π ⊕ f(x, y). The simulator S1
chooses s at random and outputs G(s), π⊕f(x, y). The simulator S2 is constructed similarly.
✷
4.4.2 Secret random bits transformation
The secret random bits transformation applies to the more general case, e.g. when the com-
puted functionality is a distribution. The drawback of this approach is that it is not guar-
anteed to yield protocols with polynomial work.
We begin with a standard lemma that states that any randomized protocol can be trans-
formed into a public-coin randomized protocol that does not use many random coins. We
refer the reader to [34, Chapter 3.3] for further details.
Lemma 4.4 Let X = Y = {0, 1}n and Z = {0, 1}m. Any randomized protocol P : X ×
Y → Z may be transformed into a protocol P ′ so that (i) For every x, y the statistical
difference between P(x, y) and P ′(x, y) is at most ∆, (ii) P,P ′ have the same communication
complexity, and (iii) P ′ uses O(logn+ log 1
∆
+m) random bits.
Proof It is sufficient to prove the claim for public-coin protocols. We will randomly trans-
form P into P ′ so that with high probability the three requirements in the claim hold.
Denote by Pr(x, y) the (deterministic) outcome of protocol P when run with random
coins r. Protocol P ′ is constructed by selecting at random t strings r1, r2, . . . , rt. On input
(x, y) protocol P ′ selects i ∈R {1, . . . , t} and runs Pr(x, y).
Consider inputs x, y. Let I(r, z) be 1 if Pr(x, y) = z and 0 otherwise. Let δz = E[I(r, z)] =
Prr[P(x, y) = z] be the probability that on input (x, y) protocol P outputs z. Let δ
′
z =
1
t
∑t
i=1 I(r, z) be the probability that on input (x, y) protocol P
′ outputs z. Note that
E[δ′z] = δz. Setting ε =
∆
2mδz
we get by Chernoff bounds that the statistical difference
between P(x, y) and P ′(x, y) is more than ∆ with probability at most
Pr
r1,r2,...,rt
[exists z s.t. |tδ′z − tδz| > εδt] ≤
∑
z
e−ε
2δzt/3 <
∑
z
2−∆
2t/(3·4mδz) ≤ 2m2−∆
2t/(3·2m)
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The probability that there exist inputs x, y for which the statistical difference is more than ∆
is thus bounded by 22n+m2−
∆
2t
3·2m taking t = O(2
m
∆2
(n+m)) makes this probability exponentially
small. Note that log t = O(logn+ log 1
∆
+m) as required. ✷
A straightforward way to use Lemma 4.4 is to take ∆ to be negligible in the security
parameter. It follows then that for every x, y the outcomes of P ′(x, y) and P(x, y) are
statistically close (hence - computationally indistinguishable). Thus it suffices to show how
to privately compute P ′(x, y). This may be done by Alice and Bob choosing shares of the
private and public coins used in the protocol and then applying Theorem 4.1 to the protocol
that (i) retrieves the random coins from the shares, and (ii) simulates P ′. This transformation
generally results in super-polynomial computational work.
4.5 Applications
For many interesting functions, there exists protocols with communication complexity that
is significantly lower than the input size (and hence their circuit complexity). For such
functions, there is a potential of getting protocols that are much more efficient than those
resulting from the garbled circuit transformation. We now show how to apply the oblivious
branching program representation to obtain good protocols for several such functions such
as the Millionaires problem and position-wise inequality. We also consider efficient protocols
for Karchmer-Wigderson games.
4.5.1 The Millionaires problem – who is larger?
Alice has input x ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob y ∈ {0, 1}n and they wish to decide whose input is
larger. A circuit for deciding whether x or y is larger has 2n inputs and thus a protocol
simulating it will perform Θ(n) invocations of the OT21 protocol. On the other hand it is
known that the randomized communication complexity of this function is O(logn+ log 1/ε)
where ε is the probability of error. We describe a simple randomized protocol for the problem
that results in an oblivious branching program with O(log(n) · log(1
ε
)) cost and linear (in n)
width (it is possible to reduce it and obtain cost O(logn+ log 1
ε
) as well).
Let xi (respectively, yi) denote the ith bit of x (resp. y) and let ~xi = x1, x2, . . . , xi−1
denote the ith prefix of x (and resp. ~yi). The idea underlying all known communication
efficient protocols for the problem is to perform a binary search for the position i for which
xi and yi differ but ~xi−1 = ~yi−1.
To be able to execute the protocol Alice and Bob have to check whether ~xi = ~yi or not.
This is done by applying a hash function hi to ~xi and ~yi and then applying the branching
program of Figure 3 on the result. The hash function hi : {0, 1}
i 7→ {0, 1}a is chosen so
that for any two ~xi 6= ~yi the probability that hi(~xi) = hi(~yi) is smaller than
ε
logn
and hence
a = O(log 1
ε
) (we assume that ε < 1
n
and in fact negligible in n). We would like to define n
such functions for all domains of size 2 through 2n based on relatively few bits. This can be
done in several ways, in particular, by sharing O(log 1
ε
) random bits that induce ε
logn
-biased
vectors, sampled via a random walk on an expander.
Given the choice of {hi}
n
i=1 the communication protocol performs a binary search for
the longest common prefix and then compares the next bit. The equality test for prefixes of
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length i is done by Alice and Bob computing hi(~xi) and hi(~yi) respectively and then applying
the branching program of Figure 3. The total error probability is ε, since there are log n
steps. We now show the branching program complexity of implementing such a protocol.
Once Alice and Bob have agreed on h1, h2, . . . hn they can define a branching program
of width linear in n to perform the binary search. Intuitively, all that the program needs
to store is the current node in the binary search tree (this implies the index i for which
prefix equality should be decided) and the status of the string equality branching program
(i.e. whether we have determined equality so far or not regarding prefix i). Therefore
the total number of OT
O(n)
1 performed is a log n which is O(logn · log
1
ε
). A more careful
implementation based on noisy binary search [15] can yield O(logn+ log 1
ε
) many OT
O(n)
1 .
Note that these results mean that whether one is interested in a communication efficient
protocol or a whether in a computational efficient protocol this is a good approach. The
difference would be in the type of OT used.
Karchmer-Wigderson games Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function. In a
Karchmer-Wigderson Alice’s input satisfies x ∈ f−1(1) and Bob’s input satisfies y ∈ f−1(0).
The goal of the Karchmer-Wigderson game Gf corresponding to f is to find and index i so
that xi 6= yi. A related problem is the universal relation where Alice and Bob are required
to find an index i so that xi 6= yi, given that x 6= y. Note that the above protocol for the
Millionaires problem actually finds the first index index i where x, y differ. Thus, its output
may be modified to output i. Hence it serves as a communication efficient private protocol
for the universal relation16. Clearly, a private protocol for the universal relation serves as a
private protocol for any Karchmer-Wigderson game.
4.5.2 Position-wise inequality
Alice and Bob each have as inputs a list of n elements x1, . . . , xn and y1, . . . , yn respectively,
each element is in {0, 1}n. They want to determine whether there exists an index i such that
xi = yi or not. This problem was suggested by Furer [18] as demonstrating a function with
low Las Vegas communication complexity, compared with the deterministic one. Applying
a private protocol for this task based on a circuit computing the relation results in commu-
nication and work corresponding to Ω(n2) invocations of the OT21 protocol (due to the size
of the inputs).
We present a branching program protocol for the problem with cost O(n) and width
poly(n). Let r1, r2, . . . , rm be m > n random strings, each of length n. Let Xi,j = 〈xi, rj〉
be the inner product of xi and rj and Yi,j = 〈yi, rj〉. Each layer of the branching program
contains mn states denoted (i, j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
16An exact definition of private protocols for relations is out of the scope of this work.
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Initial State: State (1, 1) in layer L0.
Transitions: In state (i, j) of layer Lℓ:
If Xi,j = Yi,j move to state (i,min(j + 1, m)) of layer Lℓ+1, otherwise move to state
(min(i+ 1, n),min(j + 1, m)) of layer Lℓ+1.
Value: In layer Lm state (i,m) has value 1, all other states have value 0.
It is easy to see that with m = O(n) layers the probability that the branching program
errs is negligible in n, hence we can apply Lemma 4.3 to get a private protocol.
5 Sublinear algorithms: Dealing with tables
The generalized indirect indexing primitive (recall Definition 3.2 and Construction 3.3 of
PGInd) underlies all our constructions so far, and hence these constructions make extensive
use of tables. However, the usage was so far limited to reading from tables without writing.
Furthermore, in the read pattern of PGInd is very specific – every table is accessed only once.
The limited usage of tables is reflected in PPRIVCC (Construction 4.1) and P
PRIV
BP (Con-
struction 4.2) that use PGInd as a subroutine. In a typical usage of these protocols the parties
create tables (as induced by their individual inputs) and then apply PPRIVCC or P
PRIV
BP . How-
ever, once these tables are created, their values remain static.
Overview of the section In this section we consider the computational model of circuits
with look-up tables (LUT), that allows a more elaborate usage of tables. We show that this
model is strong enough to capture write-oblivious computations on a RAM machine. That
is, computations that are allowed to perform any read operation, but whose write operations
are restricted in the sense that their location and timing are not affected by the actual
input. Further, we show that any computation on a RAM machine may be translated into
a computation on a write-oblivious RAM machine with a modest blow-up, and hence, may
be emulated by a circuit with LUT.
We start with a discussion of circuits with LUT and oblivious computation, stating
informally some of the goals and results of this section. We then go into a more detailed
account of our results. We begin by defining the LUT primitive and show how to evaluate it
privately (using indirect indexing). The protocol for private LUT serves as a building block
in a protocol for privately evaluating circuits with LUT – a variant of the garbled circuit
transformation. We give several applications of circuits with LUT, resulting in efficient
secure function evaluation. In particular, we show how to simulate any RAM machines in
our model.
Note 5.1 We deal only with deterministic computation. Randomness may be handled sim-
ilarly to Section 4.4.
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5.1 Circuits with LUT and write-oblivious RAM computation
We discuss our computational model - circuit with look-up tables – that allows an elaborate
usage of tables. In this model, the gates of a circuit are look-up tables (LUT). The LUT
input wires define the table entries and an index and the LUT output wires are set according
to the value stored in the indexed position. We define a look-up table (LUT) primitive and
show how to evaluate it privately (using indirect indexing). The protocol for private LUT
serves as a building block in a protocol for privately evaluating circuits with LUT – a variant
of the garbled circuit transformation.
Circuits with LUT amount to performing computations with tables as follows:
Read operations: The table values, as well as the index specifying the location of the read
item are either preset or the result of an intermediate computation. In particular, it is
possible to perform any kind of indirect read.
Write operations: The value written to the table may be the result of an intermediate
operation but the location should be pre-determined. (In other words, no indirect
writes are allowed.)
It follows that any computation on a RAM machine where write operations are oblivious –
in the sense that the time and location of the write operations should not depend on the
input and randomness – may be emulated by circuits with LUT.
5.1.1 Simulation by oblivious computation
An oblivious machine accesses memory locations in sequence that does not depend on the
input. For example, an oblivious Turing Machine is a Turing machine for which the sequence
of head positions (as a function of time) does not depend on the input. An oblivious RAM
machine is a RAMmachine is defined analogously. As discussed above, any computation on a
RAM machine where write operations are oblivious may be emulated by circuits with LUT.
Hence, we consider a computational model of a write-oblivious RAM machine, that may
perform any read operation, but only oblivious write operations, in the sense that their time
and location does not depend on the input. Below (Section 5.3) we show how to simulate
any RAM machine computation an a write-oblivious RAM machine with a polylogarithmic
blowup.
Simulation by oblivious Turing Machines The transformation of arbitrary machines
into oblivious machines (computing the same function) was previously considered in the
literature in different contexts. For Turing machines, Pippenger and Fischer [45] show that
any computation on a (non-oblivious) one-tape Turing Machine may be simulated by a two-
tape oblivious Turing Machine with a moderate cost. For any one-tape Turing Machine M
computing fM in time O(T (n)) there exists an oblivious two-tape Turing Machine computing
fM in time O(T (n) logT (n)).
An important consequence of the result by Pippenger and Fischer [45] is that computation
on a Turing Machine is not more efficient than circuits. For any Turing MachineM comput-
ing fM in time T (n) there exists a series of circuits {Cn}n∈IN of size |Cn| = O(T (n) logT (n))
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so that Cn computes fM on inputs of length n. On the other hand, the oblivious simu-
lation by probabilistic RAM does not seem to imply such a consequence on the relation
between RAM machines and circuits. In particular, it is not known whether for any RAM
machine M computing fM in time T (n) and space S(n) there exists a series of circuits of
size o(T (n) · S(n)).
Simulation by oblivious RAM The access pattern of an oblivious machine does not
depend on its input, hence it hides all information about the input (except its size). Goldre-
ich and Ostrovsky [19, 24] utilized this property of oblivious machines to protect software
from leaking its memory access sequence. However, to allow for efficient simulation of a
RAM machine by oblivious RAM machine, they extend the definition of obliviousness to
the probabilistic RAM machines (we emphasize that this extension of obliviousness differs
from our extension of obliviousness). On such a machine, the probability distribution of the
sequence of memory accesses should be independent of the machine input. They show that
any RAM machine computing f in time T (n) with s(n) memory locations can be simulated
by an oblivious probabilistic RAM machine in time O(T (n)(log T (n))3) with O(s(log s)2)
memory locations.
5.1.2 Closing the gap between circuits and RAM machines
The results of Pippenger and Ficher [45] imply that when considering circuits vs. Turing Ma-
chines, there is no significant advantage to the latter, since there exists a series of circuits of
size comparable to the running time of the Turing Machine. A natural question is whether a
similar result applies also for circuits vs. RAM machines. Currently, it is not known whether
for every RAM machine there exists a series of circuits of size o(T (n) · S(n)) computing the
same function (where T (n), S(n) denote the time and space used by the machine). Hence
there is a potential gap – a computation on a RAM machine may be much more efficient
than any circuit family.
We show that for circuits with LUT this gap is closed. Using the observation that for
any write-oblivious RAM machine M running in time T (n) there exists a family of circuits
with LUT of size T (n) computing fM, all we need to show is an efficient simulation of
any RAM machine via a write-oblivious RAM machine. We show such a simulation with a
polylogarithmic blow-up. Hence, for a RAM machine M running in time T (n) using space
S(n) there exists a series of circuits with LUT of size T (n) · polylog(S(n)) computing fM.
Leading, potentially, to much more efficient secure function evaluation protocols.
Note that, unlike the transformation by Pippenger and Fischer [45], our simulation does
not seem to imply the existence of small circuits (without LUT) for fM, since read operations
are still non-oblivious.
5.2 Circuits with look-up tables
The look-up table (LUT) primitive retrieves an indexed table entry privately. On input, the
table values as well and the index of the retrieved element are shared between the parties.
On output, the retrieved entry is shared between the parties. Nothing is assumed about
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the way the LUT input values are computed and shared, but, the output shares must be
random.
Definition 5.1 private (LUT ) Let R¯A = RA[0], . . . , RA[w−1] and R¯B = RB[0], . . . , RB[w−
1]. where RA[i], RB[i] ∈ {0, 1}
m. The function LUT is defined as follows:
LUT ((jA, R¯A), (JB, R¯B)) = (π, π ⊕RA[jA ⊕ jB]⊕ RB[jA ⊕ jB])
where π ∈R {0, 1}
m. The LUT width is w.
In the construction of PLUT we use the indirect indexing primitive (Section 3). Let j
be an index shared by the parties. The protocol for privately computing LUT uses PIndAB
so that the parties holds shares of RA[j] and PIndBA so that they holds shares of RB[j].
Then every party combines the shares he got. The cost of the resulting protocol is two OTw1
invocations.
Construction 5.1 (Private protocol for LUT ) Let PprivLUT ((jA, R¯A), (JB, R¯B)) be the
following protocol:
Inputs: Alice and Bob share the index and the LUT values i.e. j = jA ⊕ jB and R[i] =
RA[i]⊕RB[i] for 0 ≤ i ≤ w − 1.
Step 1.1: Alice and Bob run protocol PIndAB(jA, (jB, R
′
B)) denote the outcome as (s
1
A, s
1
B).
Step 1.2: Alice and Bob run protocol PIndBA((jA, R
′
A), jB) denote the outcome as (s
2
A, s
2
B).
Step 2: Alice and Bob locally output s1A ⊕ s
2
A and s
1
B ⊕ s
2
B respectively.
Note 5.2 Steps 1.1 and 1.2 of PprivLUT may be run in parallel, so that the round complexity
of PprivLUT equals that of PIndAB .
Our definition of the outputs and inputs of the LUT primitive complies with the garbled
circuit transformation in which the value of every wire is shared by the parties (see [20, 43]).
Hence, it is possible to use the LUT primitive with the garbled circuit transformation as
follows. The values on the LUT input wires define the table entry and an index; the LUT
output wires are set the value stored in the indexed position.
Since it is possible to simulate any Boolean gate using LUT, every circuit may be simu-
lated this way17. Moreover, a LUT may describe a complex gate with multiple inputs and
outputs, with the cost of a single application of PLUT , hence the number of LUTs needed to
construct a circuit for a function f may be much smaller than the number of gates in the
Boolean circuit for f , and the resulting computation and communication costs may be much
lower. In particular, the communication of the resulting protocol may be sub-linear in the
input size.
Using Construction 5.1 we get:
17However, the garbled circuit construction described in [43] usually results in a more efficient protocol.
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Claim 5.1 Let C be a circuit with s look-up tables of widths w1, . . . , ws.
There exists a protocol privately computing C with computational work O(
∑s
ℓ=1WOT(wℓ))
and communication O(
∑s
ℓ=1COT(wℓ)).
5.2.1 Applications
We mention two types of applications: (i) functions that are computable by probing small
portions of large data held by the parties, and (ii) function that are readily expressed using
tables.
Property testing A great source of applications for circuits with LUT is property testing,
where a (typically large) object is locally queried in order to check whether some global
property holds [7, 47, 22]. I.e. the number of queries to the object is very small with respect
to the object size (at the extreme - independent of the object size). The object is assumed
either to have the property or to be far from any object having the property. Property testing
algorithms are known to exists for a variety of properties including algebraic properties (e.g.
being a polynomial of low degree) [7, 47] and graph properties (e.g. bipartiteness and k-
colorability) [22].
Applying the garbled circuit to property testing algorithms results in a highly inefficient
protocol, since the circuit size is at least the object size. It is, in principle, possible to directly
apply Theorem 4.1 to get a communication efficient protocol, but the computational work
done by the parties may get high (due to the large size of communication complexity trees
involved).
On the other hand, expressing property testing algorithms as circuits with LUT results
in very efficient protocols. The circuit consists of three types of components: (i) components
which determine the next location to be probed in the object18 (ii) components that probes
the object (iii) a component that determines the answer. The component that probes the
object is a circuit with LUT. The inputs for components of type (i) and (iii) are small (of
order polylogarithmic in the input size, and polynomial in some ‘security’ parameter), and
thus the circuits computing them are small. For these components, one may use for example
the garbles circuit construction.
Computing on encrypted data Halevi and Mironov [25, 39] noted that some popular
private-key encryption functions (e.g. Data Encryption Standard – DES and Advanced En-
cryption Standard – AES) are defined with look-up tables, hence they are readily expressible
via circuits with LUT – suggesting a potentially efficient protocol.
Halevi suggested the problem of encrypting a message with a key shared by Alice and
Bob. Alice holds kA and Bob holds kB and the outcome of the protocol is AESkA⊕kB(m). A
potential usage is for applications that use AESk(m0) (with a fixed m0) as a substitution for
a ‘random’ function of k. Another usage is where both the message m and the encryption
key k are shared between the parties, who wish to compute AESk(m).
Mironov suggested the problem of deciding, given an encryption, whether it is an en-
cryption of a specific message without revealing the message, or the encryption key. In this
18Sometimes this component reduces to choosing a random sample.
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setting, Alice holds an encryption key k and Bob holds an encryption of a message m (un-
known to him) DESk(m) and a ‘candidate’ message m
′. At the end of the protocol Bob and
Alice learn whether m = m′ or not.
5.2.2 Sorting
We show how to construct a circuit with LUT that sorts an array of values. Our circuit
implements a merge-sort algorithm. In Section 5.3 we use this sorter in our simulation of
a general computation (on a RAM machine) by a computation that uses LUT (the more
efficient simulation uses only the merger described below).
We describe the construction of the merger. The sorter is constructed in a standard way,
applying the merger recursively. The input of the merger consists of two sorted arrays, each
with n elements a[0], . . . , a[n−1] and b[0], . . . , b[n−1]. The output is an array c[0], . . . , c[2n−1]
containing the merged lists.
The merger is depicted in Figure 4. It uses as a building block a circuit C for the task
of updating the jth element of c. The inputs to C are the indices ia, ib corresponding to the
next element from arrays a, b to be put into c. The outputs are c[j] and updated indices
ia, ib. C retrieves a[ia], b[ib]. If ia = n or b[ib] ≤ a[ia] the output is b[ib], ia, ib +1, otherwise it
is a[ia], ia + 1, ib.
c[0]
c[1]
c[2]
c[2n − 1]
ib
ia
ib
ib
ia
ib
ia
ib
ia
ia
C
C
C
C
. . .
Figure 4: A merger
Note 5.3 An alternative to our sorter is a sorting network. I.e. a comparison network
for which the output sequence is monotonically increasing for every input sequence. For
instance one may use the AKS sorting network that achieves optimal size (O(n logn)) and
depth (O(logn)) [2].
On the other hand, a merging network (i.e. a comparison network that merge two sorted
inputs into one sorted output) is not as efficient as our merger, since any merging network
requires Ω(n logn) comparators.
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5.3 Simulating RAM by write-oblivious RAM
The RAM (random access memory) machine model is of a ‘realistic’ machine that can per-
form operations involving registers and main memory, where the memory may be indexed
directly or indirectly both for read and write operations (we will defer from a specific defi-
nition of a RAM machine). A write-oblivious RAM machine is a RAM machine where the
time and location of write operations depend solely on the input size (but not on the specific
input or randomness).
Every computation on a write-oblivious RAM machine may be simulated by circuits with
LUT in a step-by-step manner. A typical step (i) retrieves the current operation (indexed by
some register) (ii) read from memory to registers (iii) manipulate registers (usually requires
a small circuit), and (iv) write to memory. Each wire in the circuit with LUT simulating the
computation corresponds to the a bit of memory or a register. For every write operation,
the corresponding wire(s) are ‘replaced’ with the wires that carry the ‘fresh’ values.
A basic simulation with O(s) blowup A straight forward simulation of RAM machines
by write-oblivious RAM machines is to simulate every write operation by re-writing every
memory location in a fixed (hence oblivious) order. To write value β into address α, Every
memory location is read and then written with its ‘current’ value, unless when its address
is α, where it is written with value β. The cost hence is of O(s) operations for every write
operation that is simulated.
Using logs To save on the large overhead introduced by the basic simulation, we incorpo-
rate a scheme that does not apply it often. We postpone updates to the memory, and save
them in a log. When many changes are accumulated we update the memory at once. Below,
we describe such a scheme, that reduces the simulation blowup to O(s1/2). Our final scheme
maintains a hierarchy of logs, such that updates propagate through the logs. With this
hierarchical construction we reduce the amortized cost of read and write operations to be
polylogarithmic in s, resting in a polylogarithmic blowup. Our constructions are similar in
nature to that of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [19, 24] and Ostrovsky and Shoup [44]. A similar
luck of efficiency problem was addressed by Rosenblum and Ousterhout [46] in the context
of file systems. They suggest log-structured file systems that optimize write operations to
the file system by sequentially logging modifications to existing data rather than overwriting
data in place.
5.3.1 A simulation with O(s1/2) blowup
To simplify the presentation, we begin with an simulation that results in amortized cost of
O(s1/2) LUT accesses for every read/write operation. The main idea is to hold a log L of
s1/2 elements that contains the most recent updates to the RAM memory. The entries of
L are address-value pairs (α, β) that reflect recent memory modifications. For every write
operation a new entry is added to L corresponding to the written value and its address. Once
the log is ‘full’, its contents is sorted and then merged with that of the RAM. To merge the
sorted table with the RAM we use a variant of the merger of Figure 4 that picks for every
address α only its most recent pair.
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Read operations To read an entry from address α, the log L is checked for the most
recent address-value pair with address α. If such a pair is found - the outcome of the read
operation is set to be its value. Otherwise, the outcome is the LUT value at address α.
Write operations To write β into address α, a new entry (α, β) is appended to the log L.
Once the log L contains s1/2 entries (the log is ‘full’), it is is sorted, merged with the RAM
and reset to contain no elements.
The cost of a read operation is of O(s1/2) accesses into L and a single access to the
LUT. The cost of a write operation is of a single access into L (when L is not full) and
O(s1/2 log(s1/2)) +O(s) = O(s) LUT accesses once L is full. The resulting amortized cost is
of O(s1/2) LUT accesses.
5.3.2 Achieving polylogarithmic blowup
We now generalize the above construction to achieve lower amortized costs. Instead of having
a single log, we will maintain logs L0, L1, . . . , Lk of sizes n0, . . . , nk where ni = s/(log s)
i and
k = O(log s/ log log s) (so that nk = 1). On a write operation, a new address-value pair is
entered into Lk. This pair gradually propagates through the logs using the rule that whenever
the log Li is ‘full’ its contents is merged with that of log Li−1. The address-value entries of
every log are kept sorted according to the address. For simplicity, we assume that log L0 is
initialized to contain the s pairs (0, 0), (1, 0), . . . , (s − 1, 0). All other logs are initialized to
be empty.
Read operations To read an entry from address α it is searched in Lk, Lk−1, . . . , L0 (since
the tables are sorted, a binary search is possible). The outcome of the read operation is set
to the value of the first matching address-value pair.
Write operations To write value β into address α, a new entry (α, β) is appended to log
Lk. Let i = k. The following process is repeated as long as i > 0 and the number of elements
in Li equals ni:
- Merge log Li with Li−1. Reset log Li to empty.
- Decrement i.
The cost of a read operation is of O(
∑k
i=0 logni) = O(log
2 s/ log log s) LUT accesses.
The resulting amortized cost of a write operation is of O(
∑k
i=0 ni/ni+1) = O(log
2 s/ log log s)
LUT accesses.
Using the transformation from RAM machine to obtain efficient secure function
evaluation protocols The transformation yield efficient protocols for functions that ac-
cess (and possibly modify) only a small portion of their memory. This is similar to what we
described regarding property checking, but more general.
Functions f that may be expressed as the composition of local computations (by the
parties over their inputs) with a global computation also yield efficient protocols. Suppose
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the computed function f(x, y) can be expressed as the composition h(gA(x), gB(y)) where
gA and gB are efficiently computable functions
19 and h is sublinear in the write-oblivious
RAM machine model. We get a secure function evaluation protocol for f with sublinear
communication.
6 Handling Malicious Parties
So far we have assumed that the parties are semi-honest. It is known that there is a gen-
eral compiler – which is not communication preserving – from a protocol for semi-honest
participants to malicious ones [23] (we refer to the description in [20]). This transformation
forces the parties to act semi-honestly. In this section we briefly outline a transformation –
from the semi-honest case to the malicious one – that is communication preserving in the
sense that the communication is increased by a factor polynomially related to the security
parameter.
Recall that the compiler has three components: input-commitment, coin-generation and
single step emulation. Our transformation follows the same lines. Each party commits to its
input and random bits. Once this is done then all that remains is for each party to show that
it is following the protocol as specified for the semi-honest case. This means that following
each step in the original protocol the sender in this step has to prove the consistency of the
message with the input and random bits he is committed to.
However, the main difference with the transformation of [20] is that since the number
of transferred bits should be at most polylog in the input size (and hence much smaller)
the commitment to the input and randomness must be computational. Thus, there exist
many possible valid opening following the commit step. It might even be the extreme
case that for any message the sender gives there exists a proof of consistency with the
original commitment. The security of the scheme should thus rest on the hardness of finding
more than one valid opening for the commitment. To make the proof meaningful, the
sender provides a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that it knows an opening of the initial
commitment that is consistent with the current message it has sent. Assuming the sender
may know at most one such opening (or it has broken the commitment scheme) there is only
one possible message in the compiled protocol for which he can provide such a proof. Since
a proof of knowledge allows the simulator to extract the witness from the prover, it follows
that if it is possible to extract two different assignments to the initial commitment then the
commitment scheme is not binding.
6.1 Input commitment
The cryptographic primitive we need is a communication efficient commitment to a large
string. Such a commitment scheme is used in Kilian’s construction of zero-knowledge argu-
ments [30]. It is based on any perfectly binding commitment scheme (applied to each bit
of the committed string) combined with a hash tree of a collision intractable hash function.
The communication complexity of the resulting input commitment scheme is thus poly(k).
19It is possible that gA(x), gB depend on common randomness, as described in Section 4.4.1.
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6.2 Random coins generation
The (pseudo) random coins used by each party are the result of applying a pseudo-random
generator G to a seed of length k. Thus it is possible to use the random coins generation
protocol as described in [20].
6.3 Zero knowledge arguments of knowledge of NP witnesses
The primitive we are after is a system of zero knowledge arguments of knowledge of NP
witnesses that operates with communication complexity polylog(n) · poly(k). This problem
has not been explicitly treated in the past. We observe however that the construction of zero
knowledge arguments for NP by Kilian [30] (see also [31]), combined with the PCP system
of Arora et al. [3] gives the desired properties.
Kilian’s construction is based on the PCP Theorem [3] and uses a commitment scheme
that allows to open the commitment for single bits. The prover is required to commit to
a proof tape τ so that every bit σ of τ is represented by the two bits σ′, σ′′ (called ‘blob’)
randomly chosen so that σ = σ′ ⊕ σ′′. The verifier simulates a PCP verifier and asks the
prover to prove (in zero knowledge) the value of a predicate concerning O(1) of the blobs.
In this proof the verifier asks to open, at random, exactly one bit of these O(1) blobs. It
follows that if the prover succeeds in convincing the verifier with high probability then it is
possible to extract a proof tape τˆ that is accepted by the PCP verifier with high probability.
Proposition 6.1 The zero knowledge argument system of Kilian is a zero knowledge argu-
ment of knowledge for a PCP proof τˆ that is accepted by the PCP verifier with probability at
least 1− ǫ.
Given a PCP proof τˆ that is accepted with probability 1− ǫ Our next step is to convert
it into a proof τ˜ that is accepted with probability 1. For this end, we consider the specific
PCP system by Arora et al. [3]. The conversion from τˆ to τ˜ exploits the fact that all proofs
that are accepted with high probability are close (in Hamming distance) to valid code-words
of a linear error correcting code, so that they may be uniquely decoded to a valid codeword.
Proposition 6.2 ([33] Theorem 4) For the PCP system of Arora et al., there exists an
efficient procedure so that given a PCP proof τˆ that is accepted by the PCP verifier with
probability 1− ǫ outputs a PCP proof τ˜ that is accepted by the PCP verifier with probability
1.
Since an assignment for the original SAT formula is explicit in the PCP proof in the
construction of Arora et al., we get as a consequence of propositions 6.1, 6.2 a communication
preserving zero knowledge argument system of knowledge of NP witnesses.
7 Discussion and Open Problems
Communication and computation We have seen how to obtain secure protocols with
reasonable computational requirements provided the parties are computable by polynomial
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width branching programs. One interesting issue this work raises is whether it is possible
to start with a (general) communication complexity protocol and preserve simultaneously
computation and communication20.
One consequence of a transformation preserving both computation and communication
is the non-existence of incompressible functions. Informally, a function f is incompressible if
to communicate f(x) with communication complexity significantly smaller than |f(x)| one
has send x. I.e. there is no way to send f(x) efficiently without revealing x. We refer the
reader to [13] for definition and applications of incompressible functions.
To understand the power of our technique we should investigate the class CCW (c, w)
- functions computable by a branching program protocols of width w and communication
cost c. For functions f ∈ CCW (o(n), poly(n)) Theorem 4.2 yields secure protocols with
sub-linear OT invocations and polynomial work. Here the results of Beame et al. [10] may
be relevant, but their notion of size is stronger than we need.
The multi-party setting The method of translating protocols in the communication
complexity model and branching program protocols into private protocols using indirect
indexing extends for a class of protocols with more than two parties. These protocols are
oblivious in the sense that the communication pattern (i.e. which party sends a message at
which stage) does not depends on the input.
Efficient transformation for malicious parties The compiler described in [20] as well
as the adjustment we describe in Section 6 is inefficient in terms of computational work.
The overhead incurred in applying Cook’s Theorem (to translate an NP statement to SAT)
and then the PCP Theorem is prohibitive in many applications. An approach that might
prove useful is to have a transformation for protocols in the semi-honest model with specific
properties, e.g. for protocols in which the parties do not learn anything (even if malicious)
until the very last step.
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A A variant on the garbled circuit transformation
In the following we give a variant on the garbled circuit construction that allows for less
computational work. Specifically, we show how to apply the garbled circuit construction
to an (insecure) protocol for computing f so as to reduce the use of the oblivious transfer
primitive. The number of oblivious transfers invocations in our construction equals the
communication complexity of the original protocol computing f . The communication is
proportional to the sizes of the circuits involved in the computation.
Consider an (possibly insecure) protocol for a functionality f . The protocol is defined
by two circuits – one circuit computes Alice’s next message given her input, her randomness
and the messages she received so far, the other circuit computes Bob’s next message. For
simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob alternately send single bit messages (Alice sends
the first message), resulting in the computation of f by Alice. We denote by c the number
of messages sent in the protocol (without loss of generality, we assume c to be even).
Note that once Alice sees her input and chooses her randomness she may ‘hard-wire’
them into her circuit, resulting in a circuit CAlice. The only inputs of CAlice are the messages
received from Bob. Similarly, Bob may hard-wire his input and randomness into his circuit,
resulting in CBob.
Protocol representation In the following we slightly abuse the term circuit and allow for
circuits with multiple input (and outputs), so that the inputs are not given at once. Given
a subset of the inputs, the circuit computes the outputs of the sub-circuit depending solely
on these inputs.
Specifically, we denote the inputs of Alice’s circuit CAlice bym1, m3, . . . , mc−1 (correspond-
ing to the messages she receives from Bob) and its outputs by m0, m2, . . . , mc−2 and z (corre-
sponding to the messages she sends and the outcome of the computation). The output mℓ is
computed after inputs m1, m3, . . . , mℓ−1 are specified; z is computed after all the inputs are
specified. Similarly, the inputs to Bob’s circuit CBob are denoted bym0, m2, . . . , mc−2, and the
outputs by m1, m3, . . . , mc−1. Output mℓ is computed by CBob after inputs m0, m2, . . . , mℓ−1
are specified.
We now show how to modify the garbled circuit construction, as described in [43], so as
to achieve our protocol. There are two main differences between our construction below and
that described in [43]:
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1. In [43] one party holds the input and the other holds a circuit. The protocol below is
symmetric in the sense that both parties hold circuits and control the inputs to these
circuits.
2. The protocol in [43] runs in a constant number of rounds. The round complexity of the
protocol below is a function of c, the number of messages sent in the original protocol.
Correspondingly, the inputs to the circuits are not given at once, but are generated
during the run of the protocol.
A.1 A protocol for computing f(x, y)
Alice’s input to the protocol is x, Bob’s input is y. We assume that Alice and Bob agree
on circuits that, given their inputs and randomness, determine the messages sent in the
protocol. Alice and Bob hard-wire their inputs and randomness in these circuits, resulting
in CAlice and CBob. These are the inputs to the garbling procedure below. Without loss of
generality, we assume a disjoint numbering on the wires of CAlice and CBob. Our description
follows closely the notation of [43].
Garbling the circuits: Alice assigns for each wire i of CAlice a random bit πi ∈R {0, 1}
and two random k-bit values (W 0i ,W
1
i ) corresponding to 0/1 values of the wire. For a wire
i with value bi, its ‘garbled’ value is 〈W
bi
i , ci〉 where ci = πi ⊕ bi.
For every Boolean gate g in CAlice computing bk = g(bi, bj) Alice prepares a table Tg with
entries
ci, cj :< W
g(bi,bj)
k , ck > ⊕FW bi
i
(cj)⊕ F
W
bj
j
(ci)
where F is a pseudo-random function with output length k + 1. The table encrypts the
garbled value of wire k using the output of F keyed by the garbled values of the input wires.
Alice sends Tg to Bob.
Similarly, Bob garbles his circuit and sends the corresponding tables to Alice.
Executing the protocol: The tables described above allow each party to compute the
garbled output of every gate given its garbled inputs. We now describe how to compute the
garbled inputs to the circuits.
Recall that very round of the protocol correspond to a message sent in the original
protocol. We describe how to construct the input for round ℓ. We consider the case where ℓ is
even i.e. mℓ is a message sent from Alice to Bob (the odd ℓ case is treated symmetrically). Let
i be the (output) wire corresponding to mℓ−1 in CBob and j be the (input) wire corresponding
to mℓ−1 in CAlice. Assume that Alice completed the computation of (a garbled version of)
Bob’s message mℓ−1 (this is the output of round ℓ − 1). Namely, Alice holds 〈W
mℓ−1
i , ci〉
where ci = πi ⊕mℓ−1 and πi is known to Bob.
The garbled value 〈W
mℓ−1
i , ci〉 may not be used in the evaluation of CAlice since the
garbling of wire i is not related with that of wire j (furthermore, had Bob learned ci he
could compute mℓ−1 and thus compromise the privacy of the protocol). Thus, Alice and Bob
run the following procedure for translating this garbled value:
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Alice creates a table corresponding to the two possible values of πi with entry ci being
〈W 0j , πj〉 and entry 1 − ci being 〈W
1
j , 1− πj〉. Alice and Bob invoke a OT
2
1 protocol so that
Bob retrieves entry πi of the table. Since this entry is 〈W
mℓ−1
j , mℓ−1 ⊕ πj〉 it is the garbled
value of wire j and hence Bob may now compute the garbled mℓ.
Let s be the total number of gates in CAlice and CBob. We get the following claim:
Claim A.1 There exists a secure function evaluation protocol for f with computational work
c ·WOT (2, k) + s ·WPRF (k) and communication c · COT (2, k) +O(sk).
Typically it is the case where WPRF is much smaller than WOT . Thus, if the commu-
nication complexity of f is much smaller than being linear (c = o(n)), Claim A.1 results
in protocols which are much more efficient (in terms of computational work) than those
resulting from the garbled circuit transformation described in [43] (and [20]).
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